The Burden of Proving Self-Defense in Homicide Cases
Instructions which appeared to have the effect of placing the burden on the defendant of proving self-defense in a murder prosecu.tion were held to be grounds for reversal in Jones v. Commonwealth,' recently decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. According to the uncontroverted evidence, on the day of the killing the deceased had provoked an argument with defendant in a restaurant, had given him a severe and malicious beating when they stepped out to the street, and had threatened to kill him that day. Returning to his home, defendant had then armed himself with a gun, and taken a stand upon the rear steps of his house. Soon thereafter the deceased came down an alley towards defendant, stopped immediately upon seeing the defendant about eighteen to twenty-four feet away, and made a moticn as if to draw something from his right pocket, whereupon defendant shot and killed him. That the defendant had armed himself after the fight may have been, as he claimed, in order to defend himself, or may have been to perpetrate a deliberate killing, as contended by the prosecution.
At the trial, the defendant objected to the instruction that "the accused must show to the jury that the defense reasonably appeared to the accused to be necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself against serious bodily harm. ' 1 2 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held this instruction to be erroneous and not cured by other instructions 3 in that it imposed upon the defendant the burden of establishing the fact of self-defense. It held that "must show to the jury" has the same import to the lay mind as "must prove to the satisfaction of the jury ' 4 2 45 S.E. (2d) at page 911. The complete instruction, No. 6 at the instance of the Commonwealth, is as follows: "The Court instructs the jury that the law of self-defense is the law of necessity, or apparent necessity, and that to make out a case of self-defense in a case of homicide, the accused inust show to the jury that the defense reasonably appeared to the accused to be necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself against serious bodily harm; and that with regard to the necessity that will justify the slaying of another in self-defense, the accused must not have wrongfully occasioned the necessity."
(The court's italics.) 3 Accord, that erroneous instructions on the burden of proving self-defense are not cured by other instructions which generally place on the prosecution the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Covington v. 470 (1911) , holding that it is for the defense to satisfy the minds of the jury that the killing was not done with malice.
"must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, "5 both of which had previously been condemned by the court. 6 The court found that nothing in the instruction limited it to the burden of going forward with the evidence, 7 and therefore that it took from the accused his right to acquittal if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt whether or not he had acted in self-defense. 8 The last two lines of the same instruction were "that with regard to the necessity that will justify the slaying of another in self-defense, the accused must not have wrongfully occasioned the necessity.'"' The court held that this, too, was erroneous in that it suggested, without supporting evidence, that the necessity of self-defense did not exist, and emphasized the erroneously heavy burden of the phrase "must show to the jury." It would seem, therefore, that the defendant does not have to prove that he did not wrongfully occasion the necessity of killing, 10 although this point is not definitely answered."
Thus, in a prosecution for murder in Virginia the defendant has the duty of bringing up the issue of his having acted in self-defense,'
2 but need only establish this defense to the extent of leaving a reasonable 5 Held erroneous in Hale v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 808, 183 S.E. 180 (1936) . 6 Accord, People v. Arcabascio, 395 Ill. 487, 70 N.E. (2d) 608 (1947) ("satisfactorily to establish any defense which he may rely upon"); Males v. State, 199 Ind. 196, 156 N.E. 403 (1927) ("appear to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury"); People v. Asbury, 257 Mich. 297, 241 N.W. 144 (1932) 3 This view regarding the obligation of a defendant in a self-defense case is not uniformly accepted, hovever, but varies from one jurisdiction to another. At one extreme, the defendant does not have to prove anything, 14 and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was criminal and not excusable on the ground of self-defense, l 5 or was felonious and therefore not committed in self-defense. 16 At the other extreme, self-defense is held to be an affirmative defense' 7 which, therefore, must be proved by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence, and the prosecution does not have the burden of proving that the accused did not act in self-defense.'
8 In between these extremes, some jurisdictions hold that the burden of proof devolves upon the defendant where the killing is admitted, 19 or is clearly proved by the evidence. 20 In others, this burden does not shift where the evidence for the prosecution raises the issue of self-defense, 2 ' even where the killing is admitted or clearly proved.
-2 In some states, statutes require the accused to prove circumstances in mitigation or justification where the homicide is proved, 23 unless the evidence of the prosecution goes to prove but manslaughter.
2 4 In others, where murder is by statute divided into two classes, it is often held that where the killing is admitted or clearly proved, the homicide is presumed to be murder in the second degree, with the burden on the prosecution to prove murder in the first degree, and on the accused to justify his act or to reduce the charge to manslaughter.
25
Notwithstanding the varied decisions by the jurisdictions throughout the United States, it must be conceded that, excepting the extreme ones, there is little actual difference between these holdings.
26 Many contradictions arise from a confusion in the use of the term "burden of proof." Its obvious and generally accepted meaning is that of the "duty to make out a case on a given proposition." Too often, however, it is used to mean the "duty of going forward with the evidence.''27 Where the prosecution rests with a bare proof of homicide, the accused, in order to justify his act upon the ground of self-defense, has the duty of going forward with the evidence upon this issue; he does not have the burden of proof upon this point, however, the prosecution having the duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. No doubt this is the intention of those jurisdictions which speak in terms of the burden of proof "shifting" under certain conditions and at specific stages of the trial.
28 If the distinction is remembered, most of the decisions, as in the Jones case, can be resolved into the following two propositions: (1) the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence to the extent of raising the issue of self-defense, 29 where the evidence of the prosecution has not already done so; whereupon, (2) the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not commit the homicide in self-defense. As thus understood, most of the jurisdictions agree with the decision in the Jones case, whereby the defendant suffers no unreasonable hardship, and the burden placed upon the prosecution is but one phase of the general burden upon it to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged.
R. EmMETT BAILEY statutes is the following from Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) , Ch. 38, §373: "The killing being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the homicide will devolve upon the accused, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution sufficiently manifests that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the accused was justified or excused in committing the homicide."
This statute seems to have been disregarded in Illinois, however, as witness, for example, People v. Duncan, 315 Ill. 106, 145 N.E. 810 (1924); and People v. Arcabascio, 395 Ill. 487, 70 N.E. (2d) 608 (1947) .
25 State v. Grainger, 223 N.C. 716, 28 S.E. (2d) 228 (1943); State v. Martin, 176 Wash. 637, 30 P. (2d) 660 (1934) . Although Virginia has such a statute, it would seem from the principal case that the presumption of murder in the second degree is sufficiently rebutted if the jury entertains a reasonable doubt whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense. But of. Martin v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 479, 129 S.E. 348 (1925) .
26 An excellent analysis of the subjeet-matter can be found in De Groot v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 244 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935 244 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935) . However, few jurisdictions hold self-defense to be an affirmative defense. See note 17, mtpra.
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